‘Fake News’

The next speaker in this Social Media & Society 2024 session is Felipe Soares, whose focus is on asymmetric polarisation on Facebook in Brazil. He begins by noting the difficulty in defining polarisation, given the wide range of definitions available in the literature, and points to our work at QUT in developing the concept of destructive polarisation as a way to determine whether the polarisation that we might observe in any given context is in fact a problem at all.

Further, polarisation is often observed to be asymmetric, with one side of politics considerably more extreme than the other. This …

And the final speaker in this Social Media & Society 2024 conference session is Victoria O’Meara, whose focus is on the anti-vaccine ‘Children’s Health Defense’ group, founded in 2016 and directed by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. until 2013; it is a key driver of health-related mis- and disinformation campaigns in the context COVID-19 and beyond.

CHD was identified as a key disinformation superspreader by the Center for Countering Digital Hate, and removed from Facebook and Instagram in August 2022 for repeatedly violating its terms of service on misinformation and conspiracy theories. RFK Jr. was similarly deplatforming, but has been reinstated …

And the next speaker in this Social Media & Society 2024 conference session is Michael Chan, whose interest is in cross-national misinformation belief and sharing patterns. Mis- and disinformation is a global pattern, but are the motivations for engaging with such content the same across countries? If not, what does the mean for countermeasures against such problematic information?

Cognitive drivers may be intuitive thinking (a lack of analytical thinking or deliberation), cognitive failures (neglecting source cues or counter-evidence), or illusory truth (familiarity, fluency, and cohesion); socio-affective drivers may be source cues, emotion, and worldviews. This paper focusses on the cognitive …

The next speaker in this Social Media & Society 2024 conference session is Hazel Kwon, who continues the COVID-19 mis- and disinformation theme. Such conspiracist claims often focussed on powerful actors (politicians and others), and this represents a reductionist worldview; these claims can have very direct material impacts on communities, for instance when they question the established science and promote vaccine hesitancy.

Some such conspiracy theories focussed directly on Bill Gates and his foundation’s work on vaccination; the present paper examines the superspreaders of such ideas on Twitter during the last three quarters of 2020. Tweets were linked to major …

It’s a suspiciously sunny Wednesday in London, so I must be at the Social Media & Society 2024 conference, where I start by chairing a panel on mis-and disinformation. My excellent QUT colleague Kateryna Kasianenko is the first presenter, whose paper focusses on COVID-19 conspiracy theories. She starts with conspiracies around the role of Bill and Melinda Gates (and other philanthropists) in global crises – they are often targets of conspiracy theories which claim that they had a role in secret plots to create such crises.

Conspiracy theories can be understood as presenting webs of floating signifiers, enabling a politics …

And the final speaker in this IAMCR 2024 session is Chen-ling Hung, whose focus is on Chinese disinformation attacks on Taiwan during the presidential election on 13 January 2024. Given its exposed position at the frontier between democracy and autocracy, Taiwan is most targetted by foreign disinformation attacks, yet remains a democratic country with the highest level of press freedom in Asia; there is considerable social awareness of disinformation challenges.

This study examined the means and themes of Chinese disinformation attacks on Taiwan, and the responses to this from Taiwanese society. It centrally builds on the concept of democratic resilience …

The next speaker in this IAMCR 2024 session is Victoria Chen, whose interest is in the influence of political misinformation in Taiwan. There are frequent presidential, parliamentary, and mid-term elections in Taiwan, and political misinformation about political parties is common. This manipulates public opinion, and can lead to polarisation and unconscious bias – the key question here is how people believe in and deal with such misinformation.

Fact-checking is one response to this, but can also produce backfire effects or a continued influence effect of misinformation. Backfire effects here mean that correction of misinformation only strengthens the convictions of those …

The third presenter in this IAMCR 2024 session is Joanne Kuai, whose interest is in LLM-powered chat bots and search engines. There is a considerable shift now underway in search: instead of presenting a list of search results, search engines are gradually moving towards the presentation of a summary of the search topic, with references attached. This is true for Google’s Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, and Baidu search, and especially important as more than half the world’s population participates in elections in 2024.

This project focussed on results from Microsoft Copilot on the Taiwanese presidential election earlier in 2024. In particular …

The next speaker in this IAMCR 2024 session is April Zhou, whose focus is on visual bias in Hong Kong fact-checkers’ gatekeeping processes. Fact-checking is of course one major response to the challenge of mis- and disinformation, and many fact-checkers have established strategies for the selection and investigation of problematic claims that require fact-checking. Such standardised approaches also serve to legitimise fact-checking organisations, and they can be understood as a kind of gatekeeping practice.

How do fact-checkers select the claims they will address, then? Key factors are empiricism (claims must relate to facts, not opinions); objectivity (avoiding selection biases); and …

The final IAMCR 2024 session for today is in disinformation and polarisation, and starts with Ivan Paganotti’s presentation on institutional communication by the leading candidates’ campaign Websites in the 2022 Brazilian election. In particular, he is interested in whether and how they tried to respond to electoral disinformation, and whether they had policies to curtail such disinformation once in office.

Data collection focussed especially on the period between the first and second rounds of the election, and examined any attempts at fact-checking electoral disinformation as well as responses to the federal administration’s social media guidelines.

The Lula and PT campaign episodically attempted to contest every new piece of what it considered to be false information, and also structurally debated the overall impact of disinformation on the political process. But its own efforts to promote ‘fact-checks’ of false information largely focussed on amplifying the responses from partisan trade unions and other organisations that were close to its own political interests.

The Bolsonaro and PL campaign avoided any discussion of disinformation; the term did not appear on the PL Website, and Bolsonaro himself did not have a Website of his own (only social media accounts). Bolsonaro only generally complained about being the victim of various ‘lies’ by his opponents, deflecting criticism directed at him and questioning the very existence of ‘fake news’ as a meaningful category.

Neither of these two strategies are especially productive; neither make a meaningful contribution to the fight against mis- and disinformation. They also do not align with the federal guidelines against disinformation published by the previous Rousseff and Bolsonaro administrations.