Making Sense of the Intersections between Alternative News and Conspiracy Theories

The afternoon at the Indicators of Social Cohesion symposium in Hamburg starts with the excellent Lena Frischlich, who shifts our focus to the question of conspiracy theories as they circulate in transnational counterpublic spheres. The digital environment provides many opportunities for new political movements, and many of them are positive in nature, but there are also many opportunities for what Thorsten Quandt has described as ‘dark participation’.

What circulates here might be misinformation (claims that counter the currently available evidence, intentionally or not); selective information choices; and purposeful, fabricated disinformation. Typical disinformation campaigns might place deceptive information in an otherwise credible information environment, and this might lead to the further circulation of and building on such information in subsequent reporting; apparently credible information may also be staged and artificially amplified, especially now also by using AI-supported techniques.

Such mis- and disinformation is often also related to conspiracy theories; these claim that conspiracies exist, describe their intentions, and explain historical or current events through the lens of these theories. Importantly, some such conspiracy theories also do turn out to be correct, of course – although the focus of the research is largely on the circulation of unwarranted conspiracy theories.

Such conspiracy theories are then often used to justify actions in the world, and to bring together communities who fervently believe in these theories. They usually involve powerful conspirators, a corrupted epistemology, and juxtapose the good of all with the good of that powerful group of conspirators.

None of this is new – but digital technologies have helped in their rapid and widespread circulation. This can threaten social cohesion, at the psychological or micro level of the individual as well as at the sociological or meso level of social groups. Misinformation can affect individual perceptions and beliefs, but effects on social cohesion depend on the content; conspiracy theories, though, often affect social capital and prosocial behaviour.

Such conspiracist content can emerge both from the bottom up (communities) and the top down (influential individuals), and fringe or alternative media outlets can be critically important in their amplification. They might focus on otherwise overlooked content, underreported topics, or the debunking of what they see as mainstream media lies, for instance. The use of such media is not a mainstream practice in Germany (some 12-16.5% of adult users frequent alternative media outlets), but still exerts some influence.

Conspiracy believers, in particular, do draw on alternative news, though this does not need to mean that alternative news themselves spread conspiracies; studies of alternative news media in Germany during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, often focussed on critiques of government actions, and published more articles with negative sentiment. They featured no debunkings of misinformation.

The available of such content does not necessarily mean that audiences actually engage with them; however, users of alternative news tend to be more critical of mainstream media and have more conspiracist mindsets. Alternative news users are also more likely to recall conspiracy theories, and experimental studies show that reading alternative news content also leads to more negative, distrustful attitudes towards the politicians it criticises. This is also borne out by other studies of social media users.

Emerging as an increasingly important complement to alternative news platforms are now also alternative social media platforms like Gab, Parker, and Truth Social. The self-positioning of such platforms, their dealings with law in for cement, moderation, and other users, and their technological affordances combine to attract certain kinds of users; they then act as a public sphere for their contexts (e.g. VK as the Russian alternative to Facebook), serve as counter-media that mimic more mainstream social media platforms (e.g. Gab as a counter to Twitter, or Bitchute as a counter to YouTube), or represent explicit fringe communities (such as 4chan or 8kun).

Using social media posts discussing conspiracy theories about the death of Jeffrey Epstein, for example, the project showed that pre-existing conspiracist communities spread their claims rapidly, connected them to their usual enemies (from Trump to Clinton), shared mainstream more than alternative sources (except on Gab), and encouraged users to ‘do their own research’.

How might we counter such influences? Various options are available, at individual, group, and societal levels: having quality information available for society; fighting root causes such as distrust and inequality for groups; and building digital literacy and cognitive inoculation as well as providing warning levels to individuals is important. Moderation and norm interventions at the group level, as well as debunking and deradicalisation at the individual level, are also critical, as are fact-checking at the societal level.