The post-lunch session that I’m attending at IAMCR 2024 is on communication around the war in Ukraine, with a particular focus on cultural heritage; I stars with Natalya Chaban. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has presented a new challenge here: a weaponised state is threatening Ukraine’s history and culture, and heritage sites are not simply collateral damage but are being actively targetted by Russia’s unprovoked aggression. Culture itself is thus a driver of conflict.
But the reconstruction of such cultural heritage is also already being planned, and must be done in the most protective and thoughtful way, also supported by EU heritage diplomacy. This also requires strategic communication: what narratives about Ukraine, Russia, the EU, the US, and Global South actors emerge here in both western and non-western media? How and to what extent does Ukrainian culture enter media coverage? What is visible; what is emotively charged; what are the ‘local hooks’ being used?
This also represents a kind of narrative turn in international relations scholarship. Narrative was always there, but usually on the margins; only recently have the more complex sense-making constructs emerged as a more central concern. These may be theorised as a strategic exercise aimed at influencing public perceptions of relevant issues; this also means that narratives have power, especially by appearing as ‘common sense’ and leading people to action; and they project a kind of ontological security that shape perceptions of the self and others – this is centrally also about the interplay between narrative and memory.
Empirical analyses of narratives examine elements such as actors, actions, goals, settings, conflicts, and resolutions; these can be examined in the context of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Awareness and knowledge of Ukraine increased substantially following this invasion, and Ukraine quickly gained greater influence and reputation; meanwhile, Russia lost influence and was widely perceived as the aggressor (though much more so in western countries than in the Global South or in China). This split in perceptions continued and deepened in subsequent months.
This reflects different narratives, and those might be influenced by media coverage, think tanks, academia, and social media. Analyses of a large volume of media coverage as well as social media discussions around the world bear this out, and prominent narrative domains relating to Russia, Ukraine, the West, NATO, and the US emerged as central here; but Ukraine and Russia were not as dominant in Chinese media, for instance. Narratives relating to the west’s interest in the war, the weakness of NATO, and the supposed ‘Nazi’ regime in Ukraine were especially strong in China and other non-western contexts.
This points to strong antagonistic narratives, but it is possible that such antagonism and criticism of Ukraine and the west is less present in narratives about Ukraine’s cultural heritage, which may resonate more strongly with such non-western, post colonial nations whose cultural heritage was itself previously threatened by war and aggression.