Brisbane.
We begin the morning of the second day at ANZCA 2009 with a keynote by Nick Couldry, whose focus is on the question of voice, especially in the context of neoliberalism. There are two schools of neoliberalism here, though - orthodox, scholarly informed economic neoliberalism as well as a broader neoliberal doctrine which has been applied to much larger areas of society, and especially to culture.
Neoliberalism works with a simplifying force: it uses hegemonic terms such as markets to convince us to treat very different areas as similar - local detail and difference is erased in the process. The response to this is to treat the term neoliberalism similarly, and point out its limitations, in order to be able to think beyond it. We may return to an older idea of the market as a reference point, and ask the economy how its freedom can have a state-creating function. In this, markets provide an organisational function.
Foregrounding the market does not necessarly focus on the economy, but applies the values of the market to other institutions in society. It requires a rethinking of many other elements of society in these terms. Nick questions the intent of such neoliberal doctrine - how does it place the individual, and what voice remains available to them in a system which both places them as independent individuals and as dependent terminals in complex societal networks?
Voice raises the possibility that the ideas of individuals may matter in organising society, in spite of the overwhelming market logic. Voice is a process whereby people give an account of the world within which they act; it is reflexive, embodied, and requires a material form; it relies on socially produced resources and is oriented to social exchange; and it can be undermined by an organisational rationality which takes no account of voice. Market is not a concept oriented against voice, but markets do not function to provide voice - market function is not isomorphic to the process of voice. Voice is an externality of market function - so political processes which focus chiefly on market functioning deny voice.
Voice as a second order value means valuing those frameworks which themselves value the process of voice, and do not undermine it. Markets represent principled competition which it is the role of giovernment to reproduce; competition is their principle of order, but it is impossible to organise society on the same principle - competition dissolves more than it unifies. And marketisation principles now operate in very different ways than foreseen by the original thinkers of neoliberal theory - networked organisation and flexible labour set new challenges, and the network presents itself as a negation of categories to which people are attached on a permanent basis.
Nick notes that the UK provides an interesting example for what happens when neoliberal thinking becomes deeply embedded in state institutions. This has also lead to a substantial reduction in election participation rates - only some 60% voted in recent elections, and politicians are seen as increasingly disconnected from the electorate. Politics is now more about putting out the story rather than about delivering anything.
This also takes place against the backdrop of increased market-driven politics - for example the growing role of foreign direct investment in national economies, which reduces the ability of national governments to control their national economies. Against this, there is a rise of audit culture in national governance, which is said to provide more transparent government but also leads to a more bureaucratic, performance indicator-based form of governance. More direct, community-involved government may exist at the local level, but it remains unclear how this level can challenge processes at higher levels of government, and how empowered global citizens may become involved in policy deliberation.
There is a possibility that the national state may be superseded by the market state - but this results in political contradictions: the offer of participation in government cannot be completely removed, and there will be more public participation in government, but it will count for less. And neoliberal doctrine requires a social politics that market conditions explicitly disable. Britain, for example, is now a more unequal and disrupted society than it was before New Labour came to power - the government has enacted the oxymoron of neoliberal policy. Citizens can no longer rely on their ability to influence government when it matters.
What abuot the role of media in this context? The apparently voice-enabling mechanisms of mainstream media are not necessarily challenging the disabling of voice in neoliberalism. This is visible for example in the context of reality TV, which places 'ordinary' people in central roles and thus gives them voice, but is now organised mainly around instruction: it tells viewers how to behave, preparing them for functioning effectively in the market society (what not to wear, how to date, how to run a business, ...).
There are also increasingly intense interactions between mainstream media processes and levels of government. Media's presence leads to a foreshortening of the horizons of government - ministers, for example, are now driven to intervene on a day-to-day basis in the workings of government rather than having a chance to set longer-term agendas. This also allows little scope for open deliberation.
What resources do we have for thinking beyond this crisis? A participative democracy in Raymond Williams's terms cannot simply be applied to an era defined in neoliberal terms. Charles Leadbeater, for example, says that society becomes more democratic as people gain more knowledge, but says little about social organisation in this knowledge economy - there is a challenge to define the substance of participatory democracy. Where may we find it?
One opportunity is in economics, by drawing on critiques of neoliberal thought in economics itself. Contemporary economics has floundered when it disconnected itself from ethics, and a more fully ethical assessment is necessary. This needs to draw on notions of human rationality, and not simply on rational choice theory; of freedom beyond the formal, simplistic definition of freedom in neoliberal theory; and of human capabilities which recognises people's ability to recognise their potential contribution to the culture in which they live. Voice is crucial to this formulation of social choice and social decisions.
Another opportunity is in the rediscovery of ordinary politics - a repolicisation of ordinary forms of government. But the most helpful reflections highlight the intersubjectivity of human life, which makes possible moral injuries - any conceptualisation of social good must recognise and address such moral injuries and carry respect for people as moral agents; there is a need also for social esteem and solidarity, that is a recognition of people as having the capacity for being constructive members of community.
There is no gap between forms of democratic practice and how we realise ourselves as social individuals, this impacts on the boundaries of political theory and extends them substantially. Markets' role in sustaining or failing to sustain social goods no longer is a market externality.
Finally, the media themselves, or in fact the changing resources for connection and communication in the current media environment, must also be considered. This is an area that is as yet undertheorised, and still focusses on specific examples and areas rather than providing a broader picture. There is great potential for the process of government to be transformed, but much work needs to be done; how can social media be harnessed without unlearning so much of the established knowledge of what politics is or can be?