The Microcelebrity Performance Strategies of a Russian Troll Account

The final speaker at this iCS Symposium is Yiping Xia, who returns our focus to the Russian-operated Internet Research Agency troll farm. One of their most successful accounts was @Jenn_Abrams, active across multiple platforms (Wordpress, Medium, Telegram, Gab) and followed by some 70,000 accounts on Twitter.

What is interesting about Jenna Abrams ‘her’-self is the creation of a distinct persona and mode of self-presentation; this account represents an interpersonal mode of disinformation. This is a form of the authenticity work which is also common to the online persona construction by ordinary users, strategic actors, micro-celebrities, and professional influencers, yet in this particular case this authenticity is of course entirely fabricated for political effect.

Yiping’s project drew on nearly 3,000 tweets from the account, as well as 45 posts from the associated blog. These were mainly analysed using qualitative methods, augmented by some further quantitative work focussing on particular discursive and communicative practices. This identified a number of distinct strategies.

First, a rhetoric strategy to establish authority through narratives of conservative ‘common sense’ opposing hypocrisy, through sarcastic use of liberal in-group language, and through the indirect delivery of critiques of liberal politics. Second, a content strategy to establish authority by sharing knowledge, by sharing reactionary conservative messages, and by passing on news items. Third, a rhetoric strategy to establish authenticity through displays of American citizenship, femininity, a conversational tone, and affective expressions. And finally, a content strategy to establish authenticity by displaying American citizenship through sharing relevant content, expressing political humour, affirming cultural affiliation, calling for interactions, and performing normalcy.

This kind of propaganda through persona is not new in principle, but is now performed by apparently ordinary accounts, not just populist leaders. Disinformation here is not just about message diffusion, but also audience cultivation, and for these aims the practices of participatory culture, audience engagement, and creative identity play are now being co-opted and weaponised by bad actors.