Mobile Technologies on the Frontline in Ukraine

It’s a very foggy Friday morning at ECREA 2022, and I’m chairing a morning session on protests, politics, and the digital that begins with a paper by Roman Horbyk, on mobile communication on the frontline in Eastern Ukraine. This is a project that was launched well before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, also covering the ongoing hostilities predating it.

Roman begins by noting the deep mediatisation of contemporary society; our urban environments are now dense with digital communication technologies, but is this also the case for the frontlines of recent wars? There are some studies already of how soldiers use mobiles and other technology in their bases, but not so much yet about their use in combat. Use in bases might reflect civilian practices, but is this still the case when it comes to combat?

The Russian war against Ukraine is not actually unique here – there are widespread uses also in wars such as those in Syria and Yemen. But mobile communication infrastructure is better developed in Ukraine, and the penetration by state-of-the-art mobile devices is much higher. Today, then, as soldiers dig their trenches they also immediately lay electricity cables and set up communal charging points for their devices.

To explore this, Roman conducted 25 in-depth interviews with military members, their spouses, and displaced civilians; the soldiers had various military ranks, and there were men as well as women in the group. He also notes that the Russian-occupied ‘people’s republics’ disconnected from the Ukrainian communications network and set up their own mobile networks with looted technology and pirated operations software.

The frontline media ecology consists of wired field phones, radios, walkie -talkies, tablets, and mobile phones (both smartphones and older ‘button phones’). The older technologies are not particularly secure. Tablets are also being used for targetting calculations, e.g. to check the alignment angles of mortars etc. Mobiles are being used to communicate with loved ones at home, but there are strict rules for such communication: soldiers may only call their families; texting is not allowed; soldiers prefer to initiate the calls; and communication is minimalist and phatic. Combat functions are combat communication and mapping of the terrain (including creating minefield maps).

There is also a use for wiretapping: hacking is comparatively easy. Similarly, mobile phone signals can be targetted by shelling, and human spotters may also use mobiles to direct artillery fire. Further, mobiles are being used for news and entertainment functions on the frontline, or for playing games (but this can also be targetted by the enemy). Further, smartphones are also being used for creating videos for fun and facts, both for creating memes and for documenting the war itself.

The Russians have now also created a new doctrine of mobile blackouts, specifically targetting mobile towers in order to undermine the coverage of activities. The Ukrainians responded to this by using mobiles less and introducing satellite technologies (such as Elon Musk’s Starlink). It’s the Russians who are more likely to still use mobile technology, however. This is now a full-fledged digital war.