Political Networks on Twitter: Tweeting the Queensland State Election

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Abstract

This paper examines patterns of political activity and campaigning on Twitter in the context of the 2012 election in the Australian state of Queensland. Social media have been a visible component of political campaigning in Australia at least since the 2007 federal election, with Twitter, in particular, rising to greater prominence in the 2010 federal election. At state level, however, they have remained comparatively less important thus far.

In this paper, we track uses of Twitter in the Queensland campaign from its unofficial start in February through to the election day of 24 March 2012. We both examine the overall patterns of activity in the hashtag #qldvotes, and track specific interactions between politicians and other users by following some 80 Twitter accounts of sitting members of parliament and alternative candidates. Such analysis provides new insights into the different approaches to social media campaigning which were embraced by specific candidates and party organisations, as well as an indication of the relative importance of social media activities, at present, for state-level election campaigns.
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Introduction

The use of social media such as Twitter for political campaigning is increasingly commonplace, from major national contests to regional and local elections. At these lower levels, given the significantly more limited number of politically active Twitter users in these smaller constituencies as well as the more modest party infrastructure available to candidates, political campaigning differs notably from the well-funded, high-stakes social media campaigns of national elections. This use in elections below the national level remains underresearched at present; a focus on national elections (and national elections in well-resourced political systems such as those of the US and UK at that) obscures the more mundane, unglamorous experience of electioneering that is shared by candidates and political staffers in the majority of elections. This paper, therefore, examines patterns of political activity and campaigning on Twitter in the 2012 election in the Australian state of Queensland. It takes a quantitative approach to the identification and evaluation of politicians’ tweeting styles, to investigate the strategic choices made by specific parties and individual candidates, and it examines the Twitter activities of the wider Queensland electorate, to explore whether candidates’ activities generate any substantial resonance; in turn, this provides an insight into the Australian political establishment’s current understanding of Twitter as a campaigning tool, and into the effectiveness of such strategies at galvanising electoral support.

Australian Politics and Twitter

Online discussions of Australian political issues are now commonplace; the pioneering work of early political bloggers and the development of commentary Websites run by mainstream media and independent groups (Highfield & Bruns, 2012) have been supplemented by widespread use of social media platforms in Australia. Commenting on politics now takes place across a multi-platform media ecology, as social media are integrated into traditional media coverage – for example, the mainstream public broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, has enjoyed considerable success with its integration of live
tweeting into the political panel show Q&A, under the hashtag #qanda. Some panellists and ABC presenters actively engage with the show’s Twitter audience before and after the show, and selected tweets are displayed on screen during the show itself. Tweeting about Australian politics is also a high-volume activity; in the first half of 2012, the umbrella hashtag for the discussion of domestic political issues, #auspol, appeared in over one million tweets, averaging over 5,000 tweets per day.

However, while discussing politics on blogs, on Facebook, or in tweets is a regular activity for many Australians, the place of the Internet within election campaigns is less established. During the 2007 federal election, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) used sites such as Facebook as part of their wider ‘Kevin07’ campaign promoting party leader Kevin Rudd as an appealing Prime Minister-in-waiting. The Internet strategy of the other major party, the Liberal Party, however, was less clear or successful (Flew, 2008).

By the time of the next federal election, three years later, online platforms had become more established. In particular, Twitter, barely present in Australia in 2007, had become an important means for breaking news as it happened. In June 2010, late-night rumours of an ALP leadership challenge between the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, and his deputy, Julia Gillard, were confirmed and reported first on Twitter. Tweets about the leadership spill were complemented by more in-depth analysis and commentary on other Websites, but the ease of sharing short comments on Twitter highlighted the role of social media in providing immediate reactions to sudden developments (Bruns, 2012; Burgess & Bruns, 2012).

Shortly after taking over as Prime Minister and ALP leader, Gillard called a federal election for August 2010. During the resulting campaign, online media were used by both major parties – but unlike 2007, neither the ALP nor the Liberal Party had a clearly distinct approach to online campaigning. Politicians and candidates from both major parties, as well as representatives of the minor parties and independents, used Twitter as a further means to promote their messages, while journalists tweeted updates from the campaign trail. Discussion of the election, and the questioning of candidates and journalists, was not limited to these two groups, though. A central hashtag emerged – #ausvotes – which during the five-week campaign featured in over 415,000 tweets (Bruns & Burgess, 2011a). Peaking at over 94,000 tweets on election day itself, #ausvotes demonstrates the presence of a large
group of Twitter users commenting on the election campaign, and the development of a public discussion around this topic; a common hashtag is not a requirement for tweets about a given subject, but by including this marker, a tweet is automatically linked to the wider group of comments that use the same hashtag.

#ausvotes and, post-election, #auspol, have led to derivative conventions for tweeting about Australian politics at the state level. Comments on Twitter about the New South Wales state government, for example, might use the #nswpol hashtag, while tweets concerning an election in Victoria would include #vicvotes. For the 2012 Queensland election, Twitter users made use of both #qldpol and #qldvotes, although the more limited interest in state-level politics also meant that these hashtags were featured less prominently during the campaign.

Specific hashtags such as #auspol also show that tweeting a lot in these discussions is not necessarily the same as participating in public debate; while there are thousands of #auspol tweets per day, a very small group of users provide the majority of these comments (Bruns & Burgess, 2012). As #auspol became the standard hashtag for discussing Australian politics, tweets and users employing this marker contributed to #auspol’s transformation into an increasingly antagonistic and partisan hashtag community rather than a space for public debate (Jericho, 2012): its leading users form an in-group which is highly active at talking (and often, arguing) amongst itself, but rarely connects with wider public debate.

The technical limits of tweeting – in particular the 140-character restrictions for each tweet – also create difficulties for sharing considered, detailed, and nuanced thoughts on an issue. It remains to be seen what, if anything, tweeting alone can achieve within Australian politics, beyond acting as a barometer of public opinion (although it should also be noted that Australian Twitter users are not representative of the entire Australian electorate).

What Twitter can provide is a simple mechanism for citizens to invoke politicians – or journalists, sportspeople, celebrities, or anyone else with a Twitter account – in their comments, and for these thoughts to be public and visible in a way that emailed communication, telephone calls, letters, or electorate office visits are not.
Politicians’ Uses of Social Media

The increasing presence of individual Australian politicians on Twitter is a notable change in their use of online communication platforms. Although politician Websites are commonplace, few active members of federal parliament ever started blogging, for example (Highfield & Bruns, 2012). This has changed with the advent of more recent social media platforms: a study examining tweeting patterns by politicians at federal, state, and local government levels in 2009 drew on a sample of 152 Twitter accounts (Grant, Moon, & Busby Grant, 2010); by July 2012, at least 146 of the 226 members of the federal Upper and Lower Houses had Twitter accounts.

This growing adoption of social media has the potential to increase interactions between citizens and politicians, by putting these different voices in the same space. Prior to Twitter, citizens could already communicate with politicians via Internet-mediated platforms. However, in Australia, using such means as email to contact politicians was done primarily by those with higher levels of engagement with both politics and the Internet (Gibson, Lusoli, & Ward, 2008), and was, usually, private communication. Tweeting at a politician, on the other hand, takes this initial communication and makes it publicly visible, potentially accessible by all Twitter users and by anyone else reading tweets on the Twitter Website itself.

Politicians have developed different strategies for their use of Twitter, given this generally public nature of tweets and replies. Grant, Moon, and Busby Moon (2010), comparing Australian politicians with a random sample of other Australian Twitter users, found that while politicians were more active in terms of the number of tweets published, they were mostly broadcasting messages at their followers, rather than engaging with other users. Similar patterns have been found in a national election context in the United Kingdom (Broersma & Graham, 2012); however, the same study found that Dutch politicians at the national level were more likely to interact and engage in dialogue with other Twitter users.

The likelihood of replies may depend on the identities of the people tweeting at politicians; in Austria, a study of groups of politicians, journalists, citizens, and domain experts found that politicians were most likely to @mention their peers within the same group (Maireder, Ausserhofer, & Kittenberger, 2012). The established political commentariat of professionals
engaged in political debate – politicians, journalists, experts – formed a dense, interlinked network through their @mentions and retweets, indicating that traditional participants in these discussions remained key figures on Twitter, even if some non-professional users were able to join these public debates.

The electoral positioning of parties and their candidates is also likely to influence the social media strategies adopted by each political actor. While major parties are essentially guaranteed mainstream media coverage, smaller parties may choose to adopt social media as a key tool for publicising their messages, in order to make up for their more limited mainstream media presence. This may be particularly sensible in Queensland’s highly limited media ecology: state-wide traditional news media options are limited to one daily state-oriented newspaper (News Ltd.’s Courier Mail), national newspaper The Australian (from the same owner), and five commercial and public service television operators, alongside various radio channels.

Queensland’s population is dispersed across a vast geographical area, but a significant percentage of its inhabitants live in and around the state capital of Brisbane, in the state’s highly urbanised south east corner; this generates substantial diversity in the state’s electorates, ranging from the large rural – agricultural and mining – areas of north and west Queensland to the suburban divisions of Brisbane itself. An associated concentration of media organisations in the south east means that different electorates are unlikely to receive a comparable amount of news coverage; in theory, this may mean that candidates outside of Brisbane could take to Twitter more readily to connect with their constituents through social media. However, the rural nature of these electorates, and the limited communications infrastructure available outside of Australia’s major cities, works against such ambitions; Twitter accessibility and take-up remains considerably stronger in urban than in rural areas.

The styles of Twitter activity adopted by parties and politicians are likely also to depend on current electoral fortunes (their likelihood of success or defeat in the election, as indicated by current opinion polls). Politicians who are all but assured of winning their local electoral contest, or even overall power in a state, may see social media as an opportunity to connect with voters, but also as a threat of making inappropriate statements which could be
exploited by political opponents, and may therefore choose to develop a minimal social media presence only. Conversely, politicians who are likely to be defeated may choose to utilise social media as a last-ditch means to mobilise supporters and campaign vigorously. Candidates locked in a tight electoral contest may use the medium to engage and challenge their opponents, hoping to win the debate or goad the other side into tweeting in anger. Any such choices may also be negotiated between individual candidates and their party campaign offices, and may be influenced by the candidate’s level of experience in using Twitter.

Finally, some politicians (particularly high-profile figures) are not necessarily the authors or publishers of their tweets – instead, those roles fall to their staff at least in part. Visible distinctions may be made between tweets written by staff and by the politician themselves: ahead of the 2012 state election, Queensland Premier Anna Bligh’s Twitter account @TheQldPremier featured tweets both authored by her staff (and signed as ‘Prem_Team’) and by herself (and left unsigned). For many minor candidates, however, dedicating staff to manage social media accounts is an unavailable luxury, and their tweets are more likely to be entirely their own work.

Candidates’ Approaches to Twitter in the 2012 Queensland State Election

This article explores how these different approaches to tweeting were adopted by candidates in the 2012 Queensland state election. Prior to the start of the election campaign, we identified some 80 candidate accounts, and tracked their activities using yourTwapperKeeper, an open-source tool for capturing Twitter data. yourTwapperKeeper queries the Twitter API for defined keywords and hashtags, archiving relevant tweets containing these terms; using the candidate accounts’ Twitter handles as keywords, we captured all public tweets which originated from or @mentioned these accounts. The 80 candidate accounts constitute nearly one-fifth of all candidates running in the election (430 candidates across 89 electorates); the majority represent candidates from the two major parties in Queensland politics. These numbers provide an indication of Twitter’s positioning as a communication tool in the election: far from universal, but increasingly strong amongst
the serious contenders. In addition to the candidate accounts, we also established archives for major political party accounts, and for the election-related hashtag #qldvotes.

The data were processed using a series of Gawk scripts developed for the analysis of large Twitter datasets (Bruns & Burgess, 2011b). These enable the filtering of tweets based on such factors as date, @mentions, hashtags, or other keywords, as well as the subsequent determination of key activity metrics (cf. Bruns & Stiegitz, 2012). In the discussion which follows, we examine Twitter activity patterns for these accounts, as well as for the overall #qldvotes hashtag, over the course of the 2012 Queensland election campaign.

The campaign must be seen in the wider context of Queensland and Australian politics: the ALP state government in Queensland had been in power since 1998, initially under the popular leadership of Peter Beattie; his successor Anna Bligh had taken over as Premier in 2007 and won a subsequent election in 2009, becoming the first popularly elected female state Premier in Australia, but had increasingly fallen out of favour with state voters during this second term. This decline was reversed briefly following her crisis management performance during the January 2011 Queensland floods, but opinion polling ahead of the election still predicted a substantial landslide win for the opposition Liberal/National Party (LNP) under the former Lord Mayor of Brisbane, Campbell Newman (who was not a Member of Parliament at the time).

While the majority of elected MPs was expected to come from these two parties, various minor party candidates did have a realistic chance winning individual electorates. Bob Katter, the outspoken Federal Member for Kennedy, in Queensland’s north west, had launched his own party in 2011 to promote agricultural and conservative views; Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) nominated candidates for 76 of the 89 state electorates. The Queensland Greens nominated candidates for each electorate, and other minor parties also contested multiple electorates, alongside independent candidates. As in other Australian elections, voting in Queensland is compulsory; for the 2012 election, 2.7 million voters were registered, with just under 2.5 million voting in the election itself (including informal votes).

Although previous elections had been relatively close between the ALP and Liberal/National coalitions (and later between the ALP and the merged LNP itself), 2012 was not anticipated to follow this trend, with the LNP expected to form the new government. In late January
2012, Premier Bligh announced a delay in setting the official election date in order to enable the report of an inquiry into the 2011 floods to be delivered before the election; this in itself signalled the start of a “phony campaign” between the two major parties, however. An official Writ of Election was eventually issued by the Governor of Queensland on 19 February 2012, setting 24 March as election date. The election finally did result in the expected landslide, with Queensland’s unicameral, Westminster-style electoral system delivering a parliament dominated by 78 LNP members, compared to Labor’s seven seats, two KAP members, and two independents.

**Tweeting Styles of the Major Political Accounts**

We therefore focus on the months of February and March, taking in both the “phony” and the official election campaign as well as its immediate aftermath. We begin by examining the tweeting styles of key political accounts (fig. 1), including party accounts @QLDLabor and @LNPQLD as well as the accounts of Premier Bligh (@TheQldPremier) and her opponent @Campbell_Newman, and their respective deputies, Treasurer and Deputy Premier @AndrewFraserMP and Shadow Treasurer @TimNichollsMP. (This excludes the nominal pre-election Leader of the Opposition, Jeff Seeney, who occupied this parliamentary leadership role before Newman’s entry into parliament and subsequently became Deputy Premier, but who was the most prominent Queensland politician not to operate a personal Twitter account during the election. Seeney, or his staff, did eventually create a Twitter presence, @JeffSeeney, on 19 Oct. 2012 – some seven months after the election.)
Fig. 1: Parties’ and leaders’ tweeting styles, 1 Feb. to 31 March 2012

Fig. 1 shows clear differences between the accounts. Premier Bligh’s account is considerably more active than the others, sending more tweets during the campaign than the three LNP-aligned accounts combined; she also sent a considerably higher percentage of genuine @replies (as opposed to retweets, or tweets which make original statements without mentioning other users). A substantial number of these @replies were not signed with the ‘Prem_Team’ handle, and must therefore be assumed to have been posted by Bligh herself; this points to a deliberate strategy of citizen engagement and conversation through Twitter.

Her deputy Andrew Fraser, on the other hand, posted substantially more retweets, but it should be noted that many such retweets also contain conversational elements: they quote a previous tweet, but in doing so add further commentary, agreement or rebuttal. Compared to Bligh’s conversational @replying approach of focussing, such interaction through retweeting can be seen as a somewhat more combatant style of interaction which seeks to address and correct specific political points, rather than establish an image of approachability.

Both Bligh (17 tweets per day) and Fraser (8) tweeted at relatively high volumes over the two months; this cannot be said for Newman (<3) and Nicholls (<1). On the conservative side, the @LNPQLD party account provides the central pivot point for LNP-related Twitter activity, while ALP counterpart @QLDLabor is largely overshadowed by the personal effort
of the Premier. This is largely in keeping with the overall political landscape: in anticipation of a landslide result, LNP candidates did not need to go out of their way to engage the electorate, and could let the party office take care of media activities. (Many of the @Campbell_Newman updates were signed by his campaign staff, indicating relatively limited genuine Twitter activity by the candidate himself.)

Indeed, avoiding substantial use of Twitter also meant minimising the potential of making embarrassing campaign gaffes which could be exploited by Newman’s opponents. This appears in keeping with an overall strategy of campaigning from a position of strength: as the clear frontrunner in the campaign, the LNP could afford to employ a relatively passive social media strategy, while the ALP government needed to try a considerably more aggressive approach to changing voters’ views. Potential for embarrassment of the conservative challenger did arise briefly during the campaign, however, when – in addition to @Campbell_Newman – the candidate created his ‘own’ account, @CD_Track (the account name apparently standing for ‘Can Do’ – Newman’s self-appointed nickname – ‘On Track’). Initiated on 5 March, and used sporadically over the following days, Newman announced its termination on 8 March, tweeting “I am going to use the other account as it has all the followers. I will use it myself from now on” (Newman, 2012), thus also implying that the official @Campbell_Newman account had at least until then been run mainly by campaign staff. While Newman denies in the same tweet that campaign pressure led to his termination of @CD_Track, we might speculate that the LNP campaign team would not have looked favourably on a potential dilution of its campaign messages across two Newman-related accounts. (On the Twitter Website, @CD_Track remains accessible, but dormant, at the time of writing.)

Twitter activities by leading politicians’ accounts are relatively steady throughout the campaign period. Fig. 2 shows the cumulative number of original tweets, @replies, and retweets by @TheQldPremier and @Campbell_Newman. For both, the rate of tweeting clearly increases as the election proper is called on 19 February, and daily activity is steady throughout the campaign, through to 24 March. Notably, @Campbell_Newman only begins to tweet substantially once the election is called, however; this points to the use of social media simply as a campaign tool, compared to Bligh’s pre-existing use of Twitter as a significant means of communication, dating back at least as far as the 2011 Queensland
floods (cf. Bruns, Burgess, Crawford, & Shaw, 2012). Both accounts virtually flatline immediately after the election, failing even to engage substantively with the messages of congratulation or commiseration which are tweeted at them. @TheQldPremier finally reemerges several days after the election, following the renaming of Bligh’s personal account to @annambligh, the consequent availability of the @TheQldPremier Twitter handle, and its re-registration by the LNP campaign team (Burgess, 2012). Subsequently, @Campbell_Newman ceased its activities: at the time of writing, its last tweet dated to 26 March 2012. (This process may well constitute the first recorded handing over – if indirectly – of an Australian Premier’s Twitter username following a change of government.)

This divergence in Twitter activity between the two parties and their respective leaders does not manifest in a matching divergence in responses by the general Twitter audience, however. In addition to the accounts’ own activities, we also tracked the @mentions received by either account. The corresponding cumulative volume of @mentions across the election period, in fig. 3, does not point to a significant divergence between the two leaders’ accounts, especially over the course of the campaign proper.
During the “phony” campaign before the official campaign start on 19 February, Bligh pulls ahead – most likely by virtue of her more established Twitter presence at the time. By the time the election is called, on the other hand, @Campbell_Newman has become better known, and mentions of that account track mentions of @TheQldPremier closely; between 19 February and 24 March, Bligh receives only 1,000 more mentions than Newman. It is only after the election, as the full results become known, that Bligh’s account is again mentioned substantially more than Newman – with many @mentions sent to express both sorrow and relief at the change of government.

This clearly indicates that at least in the present case, the volume of Twitter activity by the leading accounts themselves is a poor predictor for their popularity as recipients of @mentions. While Bligh does considerably more work to actively engage with Twitter users through her @replies, the interactions generated through this conversational approach do not manifest in a substantial advantage for her as a recipient of @mentions; rather, regardless of their own endeavours, both leaders are frequently @mentioned on Twitter throughout the campaign period. This highlights the widespread use of @mentions not with the principal intention of getting in touch and striking up a conversation with these
politicians; account handles are used simply as a convenient shortcut for referring to the leaders which is appropriate to the platform of conversation.

This interpretation of user activities around the leaders’ accounts is also borne out by the comparatively low rates of retweeting which are experienced by both. Retweeting the leaders’ messages implies that conscious attention is being paid to their Twitter activities, but this appears to be the case only for a small minority of the users who @mention the accounts; many users who @mention the leaders may not even actively follow these accounts, but simply tweet about them rather than seeking to engage with them.

Such observations must again be understood against the specific context of the 2012 election: a tighter electoral contest may well see markedly different activity patterns and a more significant engagement with the leading political accounts, as partisan supporters of either side seek to promote their leader’s statements and activities. During the 2012 election, LNP supporters did not need, and ALP supporters may have lacked the enthusiasm, to help promote their respective leaders on Twitter.

This part of our analysis clearly points to different Twitter campaigning strategies for the two leaders. Bligh had already been an active Twitter user through much of her Premiership, and (with her staff) further stepped up activities once the campaign officially commenced; this can be read as a clear attempt to use all available media channels to avert electoral defeat. Newman and his team – already well ahead in the polls – did not need to expend substantial energy on social media campaigning, and engaged only minimally; indeed, they used @Campbell_Newman almost precisely from the official election announcement on 19 Feb. to election day on 24 Mar., ceasing activities as soon as the election was won. Neither strategy, however, affected how ordinary Twitter users tweeted about the candidates.

*Networks of Interaction*

These observations also raise further questions about the overall patterns of Twitter users’ interactions with the political accounts we tracked during the state election. In their analysis of interlinkage patterns amongst U.S. political blogs during the 2004 presidential election campaign, Adamic and Glance (2005) discovered substantial network divisions along partisan lines, with progressive blogs linking to other progressive blogs and conservative
blogs linking to fellow conservative blogs, but not frequently connecting across the ideological divide. This has been seen as an indication of “echo chamber” structures in the U.S. political blogosphere, where supporters of either side are exposed only to their own side’s views, but may never encounter the arguments of their opponents in their original form.

Even though political divisions between the two major party organisations in Australia have been pronounced in recent years, our analysis of the patterns of @mentions of political Twitter accounts by everyday users during the Queensland election does not produce similar results. In fig. 4, we show the core network of @mentions of the political accounts we tracked, visualised using the Force Atlas 2 algorithm in the network visualisation software Gephi (Gephi.org, 2012) which places close to one another those accounts which are frequently connected with each other. Nodes in the graph represent individual users, and are coloured – for the political accounts along party lines: red for Labor, blue for the LNP, green for the Australian Greens, and brown for Katter’s Australian Party; grey nodes – the majority – represent the everyday Twitter users who @mention these accounts. To simplify the graph, we limited it to nodes which sent or received at least ten @mentions during the election period.

Connections between accounts – representing @mentions – are coloured according to the party affiliation of the recipient political account. This provides a clear indication of the relative interest in candidates of different political colours; that interest is centred mainly on Labor and LNP politicians, with minor clusters of interest around Greens and KAP candidates. Most notably, there is virtually no substantial separation between the two major parties: while both have a range of followers who mention only “their” side of politics, the graph overwhelmingly shows a thorough mixture of blue and red, indicating that Twitter users are generally as likely to @mention LNP candidates as they are to @mention ALP representatives. Indeed, the two major nodes for the two parties, representing @TheQldPremier and @Campbell_Newman, are located at the centre of the graph and in close proximity to one another, indicating that they were both @mentioned frequently by the same Twitter users, sometimes even in the same tweet.
This divergence of our results from those of Adamic and Glance (2005) and similar studies is not necessarily surprising, given the different communicative affordances of blogs and Twitter. Hyperlinks in political blogs can reference additional information (when embedded in blog posts) or signal ideological affiliation (when included in blogrolls) (Highfield, 2011). They are rarely used simply to reference other blog authors or commenters, nor is it universal practice to include links to the Websites or other Web presences of all public figures mentioned in a post. Hyperlinks in blogs, therefore, constitute a more rarified commodity which is activated only where especially relevant – to the extent that blog research and common blogging etiquette consider them to be part of a gift economy of
mutual linking (Francoli & Ward, 2008; Schmidt, 2007). This can lead logically to a more partisan use of hyperlinks to support only political fellow travellers.

By contrast, @mentioning on Twitter is a substantially more everyday practice which includes political friends and enemies alike; indeed, some @mentions may well stem from messages which retweet or @mention political opponents only in order to criticise their statements or views. Such critical @mentioning of opponents may even be undertaken deliberately in order to evoke an (angry) response which may then be further exploited for political gain. Beyond such intentionally combative activities, @mentions of their accounts simply provide a convenient shortcut for referring to public figures, and are used on Twitter as a matter of course. This explains the lack of overwhelming partisanship in how @mentions were mobilised by the general Twitter public in the present case: few users, for example, referred to @TheQldPremier by her Twitter username, but then avoided doing the same for @Campbell_Newman in order to deprive him of Twitter exposure.

However, if the network of Twitter interactions through @mentioning is narrowed to display interactions only between the candidate and party accounts themselves a different pattern emerges. Fig. 5 shows the political Twitter accounts, coloured by party affiliation, and indicates the strength of interaction between the accounts through the size of the lines connecting them; connections are coloured here according to the originating account. First, it is immediately obvious again that the Greens and KAP accounts form their own clusters which are connected to the rest of the network only through a small number of interactions with political opponents (usually at a local level, where opposing candidates in the same electorate @mention one another). Mainly, candidates of both parties group around their party leaders or prominent local candidates, supporting each other through mutual @mentions and retweets. To the extent that such activity is orchestrated by each party’s campaign headquarters, it also represents a dedicated multi-account political promotion strategy.
Fig. 5: Network of @mention interactions between the political candidates during the election period, coloured by party affiliation of the @mentioned accounts

There is also strong interaction between the accounts affiliated with each of the two major parties; most centrally, in each case, between the respective general party accounts and the party leaders. Minor candidates also @mention the party and leadership accounts with some degree of frequency. But a considerable amount of @mentioning also takes place across party lines between the two party organisations – and here, especially directed by Labor candidates at their LNP opponents. Of the party leadership teams, Labor’s Deputy Premier @AndrewFraserMP is the most prominent combatant: he frequently @mentions his opposite number @TimNichollsMP as well as @Campbell_Newman, while – in spite of her frequent @replies to other Twitter accounts – Premier Anna Bligh remains relatively subdued in her interactions with the other side. This is likely to point to a deliberate campaign strategy which positions Fraser as leading the attack while Bligh remains in a more presidential role above the fray.

Newman’s direct opponent in the Brisbane city electorate of Ashgrove, @katejonesmp, also appears as a prominent account in this analysis, @mentioning @Campbell_Newman with
some frequency; she played a pivotal role in Labor’s election strategy, as a strong performance by her would have raised doubts about Newman’s ability to enter parliament in order to take up the Premiership in the first place. However, her @mentions towards Newman remain comparatively muted, as the development of a perception of her as too aggressive in style would have hindered rather than helped her public image. Finally, local Surfers Paradise candidate @matt4surfersalp appears to have taken on a similar attacking role, possibly on his own initiative: his is the ALP-affiliated account which most frequently mentions @LNPQLD and @Campbell_Newman, alongside @TheQldPremier.

In keeping with their electoral positioning ahead of the election, LNP accounts largely refrain from responding in kind; again, this “small target” strategy also serves to minimise any possible Twitter missteps which could be exploited by their Labor opponents. Some of @TimNichollsMP’s few tweets do @mention Andrew Fraser, and the accounts of shadow minister @JPLangbroek and local candidate @ScottDriscollAu do engage with @QLDLabor as well as @AndrewFraserMP and @TheQldPremier, respectively, but generally fail to make a substantial impact on the political discussion on Twitter.

**Hashtagged Activity**

The activities of Twitter users around the key political accounts in the 2012 Queensland state election must also be understood against the background of general activities in the #qldvotes hashtag. As it is impossible to reliably identify and analyse every last tweet which comments, however peripherally, on the Queensland election, the stream of tweets which have deliberately been marked with the #qldvotes hashtag must stand in as a reasonable approximation of overall tweeting activity; however, the self-selecting nature of this sample must be noted and understood in this context. Constituted of tweets whose authors consciously chose to contribute them to a continuing public discussion of the election, #qldvotes represents a temporary, ad hoc public (Bruns & Burgess, 2012) – but does not contain the less visible, at least notionally private messages intended by Twitter users only for their networks of followers. #qldvotes may also be seen as a deliberate performance of public election discussion, therefore.

This also accords with Larsson and Moe’s observation that election-related tweeting “appears to be largely dependent on other mediated events” (2012, p. 13) – a pattern which
Bruns and Burgess (2011a) found in their study of the use of Twitter in the 2010 Australian federal election, too. Public discussion of political events through shared hashtags will be most inclusive and effective if it discusses shared texts (newspaper reports, TV programmes, major campaign events) that are accessible to all participants; spikes in Twitter activity around events such as televised leaders’ debates, policy announcements, or election day coverage are a common occurrence, therefore.

This is evident in our #qldvotes data well (fig. 6). Unsurprisingly, the major spike in Twitter activity (at close to 10,000 hashtagged tweets that day) occurs on election day, 24 March 2012. Substantial activity begins only with the official commencement of the campaign on 19 February, with a series of minor spikes evident especially during the second half of the election period.

![Graph showing #qldvotes activity during February and March 2012](image)

**Fig. 6: #qldvotes activity during February and March 2012**

After a quiet first third of the campaigning period, 4 March sees a first minor spike as the Liberal/National Party celebrates its official campaign launch. A further period of heightened activity on 10 March is triggered by an opinion poll which sees Labor’s Kate Jones ahead of Campbell Newman in the Ashgrove electorate, raising the possibility that the LNP might win the election, but that its declared candidate for Premier could fail to enter parliament; Labor’s own official campaign launch follows on 11 March. 15 March sees a combination of
major events, from a visit of former Liberal Party Prime Minister John Howard to the Ashgrove electorate in support of Newman through the escalation of a Labor campaign alleging inappropriate business dealings by Newman and his wife to a televised “People’s Forum” with the leaders. A final leaders’ debate in the evening of 19 March accounts for the spike on that day.

To determine whether such user activity in the #qldvotes hashtag points to the presence of engaged Twitter-based followers of the campaign, or merely to a barrage of random tweets which do not engage with one another, it is also useful to explore the patterns of interaction between #qldvotes contributors. In doing so, we follow Tedjamulia et al. (2005) in distinguishing three groups of participants amongst the 8973 unique contributors to #qldvotes whom we observed over the course of February and March 2012: the least active 90% of participants, the next 9% of highly active users, and a final 1% of most active contributors. For each of these groups, and for the overall hashtag dataset, we may then calculate their activity patterns (see Bruns & Stieglitz, 2012, for a detailed discussion of this approach).

Fig. 7: Contribution patterns to the #qldvotes hashtag, February/March 2012
This analysis points to the presence of a dominant core of #qldvotes participants: in combination, lead and highly active users account for more than three quarters of all #qldvotes tweets. While this points to a comparatively small base of dedicated contributors to the hashtag, it also points to the possibility of forms of close interaction – indeed, to the potential to generate a shared sense of community – which it would not be possible to develop amongst a much larger userbase (for example, in the context of a major national election attracting tens or hundreds of thousands of users to the hashtag). Further, fig. 7 shows the presence of a substantially larger percentage of @replies in the tweets of these leading user groups, as compared to those of the least active 90% of contributors; this, too, supports the view that greater community interaction is taking place amongst these leading groups than with the least active group, whose activities consist predominantly of making original statements and retweeting the messages of others. (It is further notable that the percentage of @replies for the top 1% of lead users is greater yet again than that for the next 9% of highly active users.)

Further Outlook

The longer-term impact of such temporary communion around a shared election hashtag has yet to be fully explored. It is unlikely that all of the leading #qldvotes participants will make the transition to the continuing day-by-day discussion of Queensland politics in #qldpol, for example; a post-election decline in political interest and participation is documented well beyond the specific confines of Twitter (Kirchhoff et al., 2009; Macnamara, 2011).

The same is true also for the Twitter activities of the political accounts we have studied in this article, of course – especially in the context of a decisive election delivering a change of government. In the LNP’s landslide victory, 48 seats changed their hands from one party to another; in particular, 44 seats changed from Labor to either the LNP or Katter’s Australian Party. Prior to the election, many of the sitting politicians on Twitter included their role in their user names, such as @katejonesmp or @TheQldPremier, as a means of authenticating the user as a politician. However, the result of the election meant that many of these accounts were now no longer appropriately named, since the users in question had not been re-elected or – like Anna Bligh – had lost their government functions, and relevant
accounts were rebranded in response to the election result. Further, those successful and – especially – unsuccessful candidates who had only begun to use Twitter at the start of the campaign, possibly at the behest of their campaign headquarters, now also had to decide whether they wanted to continue their Twitter activities post-election. These post-election changes have clear implications for research which tracks the tweets by, and mentions of, specific Twitter accounts beyond the election campaigns themselves; regular checks of the accounts tracked are required to ensure that the project is capturing the intended data. More generally, they also indicate for each candidate whether they understand Twitter predominantly as a campaigning tool, or have incorporated social media fully into their everyday political activities.

Conclusion

Overall, the findings of our study must be understood against the backdrop of an election which had always been predicted to result in a landslide win for the LNP opposition. This electoral starting-point appears to have resulted in the adoption of some highly divergent social media strategies by the two major parties: on the one hand, the highly active use of Twitter by the ALP, with a clear distribution of roles across its leading accounts, a campaign of strong personal activity by the Premier and an at times aggressive approach to engaging with LNP opponents by Treasurer Andrew Fraser and other candidates; on the other, the “small target” strategy of the Liberal/National Party, which did institute “personal” accounts for some of its leaders but (as it seems from the @CD_Track episode) closely policed those accounts and otherwise positioned its generic @LNPQLD party account as the central, staid Twitter presence. Beyond this, the smaller parties developed their own social media strategies, and mainly used Twitter to generate interactions between their own accounts.

We have also documented that the respective levels of active Twitter usage by the various candidates are generally not reflected in their prominence and visibility in the total number of @mentions made of them by everyday Twitter users, however; rather, the Twitter handles of specific politicians appear simply to stand in as substitutes for their full names, and are used by supporters and opponents alike without such use conferring any notable approval or disapproval. At least in the specific context of the 2012 Queensland election, this raises significant doubts about the ability of Twitter (and perhaps of overall social
media) campaigning to affect electoral outcomes in any direct way; ordinary Twitter users appeared to be substantially more likely to use the politicians’ Twitter handles to talk about them than strike up a conversation with them, even in spite of the considerable outreach efforts of Anna Bligh’s @TheQldPremier account and those of a handful of other candidates. In the end, Bligh’s highly active and Newman’s largely passive account were @mentioned with similar frequency.

This also highlights the limited utility of any simplistic electoral sentiment schemes which merely measure the relative visibility through @mentions of political accounts without investigating in much greater depth the context in which such account names are mentioned. Even apart from the fact that Twitter demographics – in Australia or elsewhere – are rarely representative of the general population, any attempts to forecast election outcomes from the relative Twitter activity around the major candidates’ accounts should be approached with great caution, therefore.

The same is true for studies which focus only on election-related hashtags, however. As our analysis of #qldvotes has shown, that hashtag was ultimately dominated by a small community of fewer than 1,000 Twitter users, whose interactions amongst one another may be of interest in their own right, but whose high levels of engagement with the election campaign designate them as “political junkies” (Coleman, 2003) and therefore far from representative of the wider electorate. There are few opportunities to overcome such sampling bias, short of tracking every conceivable keyword which may be used in conjunction with political discussion on Twitter – and on balance, a focus on the @mentions of politicians and other relevant accounts may provide a better and more diverse cross-section through election-related political discussion on that platform than is provided by a focus on hashtags alone, as it does not base itself on an already self-selected group of highly engaged political discussants in the way that a hashtag dataset does.

What is necessary as a next step beyond the more limited analysis which we have been able to present in this article, then, is the comprehensive semantic analysis – including a focus on the key terms, concepts, and attitudes expressed in the tweets – of @mention datasets as we have analysed them here. In addition to tracking the relative prominence of the various political accounts, such an analysis might be able to identify the key themes and sentiments
associated with such accounts, and explore how these may affect the electoral fortunes of the account holders.

Overall, our analysis here demonstrates the use of diverse Twitter campaigning strategies which match the divergent electoral fortunes of the various parties and candidates in the 2012 Queensland election; it also appears to show the relative inability of such strategic choices to affect the overall political debate on Twitter about the election, however. Further analysis of comparable election campaigns must show whether these observations are unique to this election, whose outcomes were rarely in doubt, and whether a closer electoral contest, for example, may generate considerably more active use of social media by all parties, not least also in order to directly engage with the opposition and its supporters.


